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1 
CHALLENGING NPDES PERMITS GRANTED 
WITHOUT PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
Terence J. Centner* 
Abstract: Efforts to enhance water quality include citizen oversight of the 
development of effluent limitations set forth in National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System permits. Because concentrated animal feeding 
operations (CAFOs) generate considerable manure that may be associ-
ated with water pollution, environmental groups have challenged EPA’s 
regulations, including the absence of a right to participate in the devel-
opment of effluent limitations. Without public input, there is a restricted 
dialogue on alternatives and fewer opportunities for enforcement actions. 
Revised regulations covering discharges from CAFOs contain new re-
quirements for permit applicants. Before the authorization of any dis-
charge by a permitting authority, the public must have an opportunity to 
evaluate the effluent standards. A review of several cases suggests that the 
participation requirements apply not only to new discharges, but also 
modifications to discharges in existing permits. The regulations and cases 
suggest that citizens can be even more active in championing environ-
mental quality. 
Introduction 
 To foster a more robust democracy, Congress granted citizens op-
portunities to participate in establishing environmental regulations and 
ensuring their enforcement. There are significant public participation 
requirements at three stages. First, when an agency adopts new regula-
tions, the public has a right to be involved.1 Individuals, business enti-
ties, and groups can present data and push for the adoption of regula-
tions to address perceived problems.2 The second major stage of public 
                                                                                                                      
* © 2011, Terence J. Centner is a Professor with the College of Agricultural and Envi-
ronmental Sciences at the University of Georgia in Athens. The research presented here is 
based on work supported by the Cooperative State Research Education and Extension 
Service (CSREES), U.S. Department of Agriculture Project No. GEO00684. 
1 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006) (setting forth parameters for public participation in 
rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act). 
2 Id. § 553(e); see, e.g., Timothy Riley, Note, Piercing the Regulatory Veil: The Need to Ex-
pand Federal Clean Water Act NPDES Permit Coverage to Include Municipal “Satellite” Sewer Collec-
tion Systems, 26 Va. Envtl. L.J. 615, 615–17 (2008) (advocating greater regulation of satel-
lite sewer collection systems). 
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involvement occurs when agencies issue permits; requirements com-
mand that the public has an opportunity to be involved in reviewing 
permit applications.3 Third, many federal environmental statutes allow 
citizens to bring suits to enforce laws or to compel action by federal 
agencies.4 Citizen suits allow successful plaintiffs to be awarded attorney 
fees.5 Citizen suit provisions have been employed to address environ-
mental violations and enhance governmental enforcement.6 
 Dissatisfaction with the quality of our environment has led citizen 
groups to become active participants in all three of these opportunities 
for public involvement, and citizen suits have been important in achiev-
ing the goals of environmental legislation.7 However, citizen suits are 
limited by the statutory grant, requirements of injury, and redressabil-
ity.8 Moreover, citizen suits generally are not possible if a government is 
already diligently prosecuting an action.9 Courts have interpreted fed-
                                                                                                                      
3 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (2006) (mandating public participation in developing 
and enforcing effluent limitations, which are set forth by permits). 
4 See 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a) (2006) (Toxic Substances Control Act); 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) 
(2006) (Endangered Species Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2006) (Clean Water Act); 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(g)(1) (2006) (Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-
8(a) (2006) (Safe Drinking Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (2006) (Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2006) (Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a) (2006) 
(Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 11046(a) (2006) (Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act). 
5 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (granting attorney’s fees for citizen suits under the 
Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(d) (granting attorney’s fees under the Safe Drinking 
Water Act); see also Matthew Burrows, Note, The Clean Air Act: Citizen Suits, Attorneys’ Fees, 
and the Separate Public Interest Requirement, 36 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 103, 117–18 (2009) 
(discussing the requirement of success on the merits of a lawsuit before awards of attor-
ney’s fees are appropriate). 
6 See Alberto B. Lopez, Laidlaw and the Clean Water Act: Standing in the Bermuda Triangle 
of Injury in Fact, Environmental Harm, and “Mere” Permit Exceedances, 69 U. Cin. L. Rev. 159, 
160 (2000) (advancing the idea that citizen suits spur governmental enforcement); Janet 
V. Siegel, Negotiating for Environmental Justice: Turning Polluters into “Good Neighbors” Through 
Collaborative Bargaining, 10 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 147, 164 (2002) (noting some successful use 
of citizen suits by low-income communities to secure relief from unlawful pollution); Mat-
thew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen 
Suits, 21 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 81, 84 (2002) (advancing the idea that citizen suit provisions 
can encourage vigorous enforcement efforts). 
7 See Nancy Perkins Spyke, Public Participation in Environmental Decisionmaking at the New 
Millennium: Structuring New Spheres of Public Influence, 26 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 263, 275–
77 (1999). 
8 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562–63, 568 (1992) (dismissing a cit-
izen suit due to lack of standing due to inadequate injury and redressability). 
9 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2619(b)(1)(B); 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-
8(b)(1)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 11046(e). 
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eral law to further limit citizen suits via standing or deferring to deci-
sions by the regulatory authority.10 
 This Article addresses opportunities for citizen involvement in the 
issuance of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
permits, and the use of citizen suits to compel regulatory authorities to 
provide requisite opportunity for input. Congressional directives in sec-
tion 101 of the Clean Water Act (CWA),11 and their application to the 
permitting of discharges from concentrated animal feeding operations 
(CAFOs), provide opportunities for enhanced citizen input. Failure to 
allow the public to participate in the CWA’s permitting process has led 
to citizen suit challenges. Citizen participation in the regulation of CA-
FOs under the CWA provides informative examples of the benefits of 
public involvement at multiple stages of environmental regulation.12 
 CAFOs are listed as point sources under the CWA and therefore 
need to secure NPDES permits before they can discharge pollutants 
into waters of the United States.13 Although CAFOs are defined by 
CWA regulations, disdain for CAFO operations is not solely premised 
on water pollution. The public is also concerned about the humane-
ness of raising animals at concentrated facilities,14 the demise of family 
farms,15 the overuse of antibiotics,16 and air pollution from large con-
                                                                                                                      
10 See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 (finding that citizens lack standing to bring suit); 
Ark. Wildlife Fed’n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 381 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that 
comparable state public participation provisions were sufficient even if they did not allow 
the same participation as available under federal law); N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass’n v. 
Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 557 (1st Cir. 1991) (deferring to a state agency’s actions in 
enforcing discharge limitations under the Clean Water Act). 
11 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006) (stating purpose of the Act and delineating participation 
requirements). 
12 See Ayako Sato, Note, Public Participation and Access to Clean Water: An Analysis of the 
CAFO Rule, Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y, Winter 2005, at 40, 43. 
13 See 40 C.F.R. § 412.1 (2010); see also 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342, 1362(14) (defining 
point source and precluding discharges of pollutants except as authorized). 
14 See, e.g., Gaverick Matheny & Cheryl Leahy, Farm-Animal Welfare, Legislation, and 
Trade, 70 Law & Contemp. Probs. 325, 344 (2007) (advocating alternative production 
methods to eliminate sow gestation crates and battery cages for chickens); Lars Johnson, 
Note, Pushing NEPA’s Boundaries: Using NEPA to Improve the Relationship Between Animal Law 
and Environmental Law, 17 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 1367, 1407–08 (2009) (suggesting use of 
NEPA to challenge the inhumane treatment of animals at CAFOs). 
15 See, e.g., Kate Celender, Note, The Impact of Feedlot Waste on Water Pollution Under the Na-
tional Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), 33 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 
947, 960 (2009) (claiming that CAFOs can lead to the demise of family farms); Johnson, 
supra note 14, at 1408 (claiming that “CAFOs threaten the existence of family farms”); Ryan 
Alan Mohr, Note, Waterkeeper Alliance v. EPA: A Demonstration in Regulating the Regulators, 10 
Great Plains Nat. Resources J. 17, 17–18 (2006) (noting that CAFOs keep getting larger 
and displacing family farms). 
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centrations of animals.17 The animosity against CAFOs may stem from 
one or more of these issues, and the negative externalities associated 
with the production of food animals at CAFOs provides arguments for 
regulating their activities. Efforts to assist family farms have lead some 
environmentalists to argue that if CAFOs had to internalize pollution 
costs accompanying the production of animals, they would not be any 
more economically efficient than traditional farms.18 
 CAFOs have been regulated by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) under a CAFO Rule since the 1970s,19 and the federal 
regulations governing their discharges have been successively chal-
lenged since the early 1990s.20 The EPA responded to a judicial order 
by enacting a revised CAFO Rule in 2003.21 Environmental and agricul-
tural interest groups immediately challenged selected provisions of the 
2003 CAFO Rule in Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. United States EPA.22 
 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued the Waterkeeper deci-
sion, which addressed petitioners concerns and required the EPA to 
develop yet another revised rule.23 One of the major issues addressed 
                                                                                                                      
16 See generally Terence J. Centner, Regulating the Use of Non-Therapeutic Antibiotics in Food 
Animals, 21 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (2008) (discussing the adoption of a precaution-
ary principle to safeguard human health by limiting the use of non-therapeutic antibiotics 
in food animals). 
17 See, e.g., Jody M. Endres & Margaret Rosso Grossman, Air Emissions from Animal Feed-
ing Operations: Can State Rules Help?, 13 Penn St. Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 1–51 (2004) (surveying 
state law to discern measures to govern air emissions from livestock facilities); K.M. Thu, 
Public Health Concerns for Neighbors of Large-Scale Swine Production Operations, 8 J. Agric. 
Safety & Health 175, 176–82 (2002) (reviewing research related to health issues for per-
sons exposed to emissions from large swine production facilities); Mariel Kusano, Note, 
Rewarding Bad Behavior: EPA’s Regime of Industry Self-Regulation, 12 Hastings W.-Nw. J. En-
vtl. L. & Pol’y 167, 169–71 (2006) (discussing the hazards of air pollutants from animal 
production). 
18 See, e.g., Susan M. Brehm, From Red Barn to Facility: Changing Environmental Liability to 
Fit the Changing Structure of Livestock Production, 93 Calif. L. Rev. 797, 814–15 (2005) (dis-
cussing large-scale animal production). 
19 Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 41 Fed. Reg. 11458 (Mar. 18, 1976) (cod-
ified as amended at 40 C.F.R. pts. 124, 125); Effluent Limitations Guidelines, 39 Fed. Reg. 
5704 (Feb. 14, 1974) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. pt. 412); see also National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent Limitations Guidelines and 
Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs), 68 Fed. Reg. 7176, 7176 
(Feb. 12, 2003) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 412) [hereinafter Preamble to the 2003 
CAFO Rule]. 
20 See, e.g., Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 
115–16 (2d Cir. 1994). 
21 Preamble to the 2003 CAFO Rule, supra note 19, at 7179 (acknowledging the 1974 
and 1976 regulations). 
22 399 F.3d 486, 497 (2d Cir. 2005). 
23 See id. at 524. 
2011] Public Participation Challenges & NPDES Permits   5 
by the Waterkeeper court was the ability of the public to participate in the 
development of applicants’ nutrient management plans set forth in 
NPDES permits.24 The court found that the 2003 CAFO Rule violated 
section 101 of the CWA’s public participation requirements, because it 
allowed permitting authorities to approve NPDES permits without re-
vealing the particulars of nutrient management plans, and vacated that 
portion of the 2003 CAFO Rule.25 
 Similarly, Sierra Club Mackinac Chapter v. Department of Environmental 
Quality, involved a challenge to the public participation opportunities 
provided in a state-administered NPDES permitting program.26 Michi-
gan’s approval process for discharges under general permits failed to 
allow the public to participate in developing and revising CAFOs’ nu-
trient management plans.27 The court noted that allowing concerned 
citizens access to nutrient management plans through a Freedom of 
Information Act request did not provide the public “meaningful review 
during its development.”28 Michigan’s permit program was found to be 
deficient because it did not provide public participation as required by 
federal statutory requirements.29 
 In 2008, the EPA adopted a revised CAFO Rule that responded to 
the shortcomings of the 2003 Rule.30 However, agricultural interest 
groups claim provisions of this rule are contrary to the congressional 
dictates of the CWA, and have challenged the 2008 CAFO Rule in the 
Fifth Circuit.31 Litigation over the 2008 CAFO Rule highlights the diffi-
culty in devising regulations that comply with federal law without going 
too far.32 
                                                                                                                      
24 Id. at 503–04, 524 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (2006)). 
25 Id. 
26 747 N.W.2d 321, 334–35 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (challenging public participation 
under Michigan’s CAFO regulations); see Terence J. Centner, Courts and the EPA Interpret 
NPDES General Permit Requirements for CAFOs, 38 Envtl. L. 1215, 1228–29 (2008) (analyzing 
the Sierra Club Mackinac Chapter case, including the issue of inadequate public participa-
tion). 
27 Sierra Club Mackinac Chapter, 747 N.W.2d at 334–35. 
28 Id. at 335. 
29 Id. 
30 See Revised National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and 
Effluent Limitations Guidelines for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations in Response 
to the Waterkeeper Decision, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,418 (Nov. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Preamble 
to the 2008 CAFO Rule] (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 412). 
31 See generally Opening Brief of Petitioners at 28, Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. EPA, 
No. 08–61093, (5th Cir. Dec. 7, 2009) [hereinafter Pork Producers Brief] (challenging the 
2008 CAFO Rule as exceeding EPA’s authority). 
32 See, e.g., Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 497–524 (2d Cir. 
2005); Pork Producers Brief, supra note 31, at 37–86. 
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 This Article addresses public participation and citizen suits to por-
tend that environmentalists have a potent weapon to garner further 
compliance with NPDES permitting provisions of federal environ-
mental statutes. Part One briefly addresses concerns about water pollu-
tion from CAFOs. Evidence suggests large animal producers may over-
apply manure to fields, which leads to nutrient pollution of waters of 
the United States. The EPA has struggled to meaningfully address the 
pollutants entering surface waters from the land application of ma-
nure.33 Part Two summarizes participation under the CWA and the in-
tent of Congress in delineating citizen input requirements for the 
NPDES permitting process. The Act is explicit in commanding oppor-
tunities for public input in processes regulating discharges of pollut-
ants.34 Part Three turns to the judicial interpretation of the Act and its 
parameters for public participation. Courts have held that the public 
has a right to participate in the development of effluent limitations, 
enforcement provisions, and notices of intent under general permits.35 
 Part Four analyzes the Act’s citizen suit provisions and what they 
mean with respect to public participation. Because courts have found 
that a statutory “diligent-prosecution” bar in the Act limits citizen par-
ticipation, the bar is analyzed to determine congressional intent.36 This 
analysis serves as guidance for examining the meaning of public par-
ticipation in the NPDES permitting process in Part Five. Judicial prece-
dents suggest that the failure of a permitting authority to provide an 
opportunity for participation in the modification of a permit may mean 
that the permit is invalid. Given judicial pronouncements, permittees 
may find it advantageous to encourage permitting authorities to com-
ply with public participation requirements, while citizen groups may 
employ citizen suits to become more active in participating in permit-
ting activities.37 
I. CAFO Water Pollution 
 During the last fifty years, pastoral landscapes of animals grazing in 
pastures at family farms have vanished.38 Concentrations of animals of a 
single species at production locations have become prevalent, creating 
                                                                                                                      
33 See infra Part I. 
34 See infra Part II. 
35 See infra Part III. 
36 See infra Part IV. 
37 See infra Part V. 
38 See Terence J. Centner, Empty Pastures: Confined Animals and the Transfor-
mation of the Rural Landscape 1–25 (2004). 
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manure disposal problems.39 When many large farms are located in a 
single region, manure volume may become excessive.40 Watersheds are 
being polluted by nitrogen and phosphorus from the large amounts of 
animal manure that are applied to fields.41 Given negative externalities 
associated with polluted waters, parties are filing lawsuits against animal 
producers and firms associated with animal production.42 
 Under the CWA, large animal farms are labeled as CAFOs.43 The 
EPA has enacted a CAFO Rule that defines CAFOs based on the num-
ber of animals of a given species at a location.44 Three subcategories of 
CAFOs are distinguished in the rule: Large, Medium, and Small.45 CA-
FOs that discharge pollutants into waters of the United States are re-
quired to secure NPDES permits.46 Most CAFOs with NPDES permits 
are Medium and Large CAFOs consisting of the following numbers of 
animals: 
200 or more dairy cows; 
                                                                                                                      
39 Marc Ribaudo et al., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Agric. Econ. Rep. No. 824, Manure 
Management for Water Quality: Costs to Animal Feeding Operations of Applying 
Manure Nutrients to Land 1 (2003). One study showed that “[o]nly 18 percent of large 
hog farms and 23 percent of large dairies are currently applying manure on enough land 
to meet a nitrogen standard.” Id. at 83. For purposes of this Article, manure will refer to 
manure, litter, or process wastewater, since the CAFO Rule applies to these forms of waste 
accompanying animal production. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(a) (2010). 
40 See David A. Fahrenthold, Rising with a Bullet Among Top Pollutants: Number Two, Wash. 
Post, Mar. 1, 2010, at A1 (noting the irony that a natural product like nitrogen should be a 
major pollutant). See generally Noel Gollehon et al., U.S. Dept. of Agric., Agric. Bull. 
No. 771, Confined Animal Production and Manure Nutrients, at iii–2 (2001) (analyz-
ing applications of manure at agronomic rates to show excess nutrients in some counties). 
41 See First Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 74–75, Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 4:05-
cv-00329 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Tyson Complaint]. 
42 See Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 565 F.3d 769, 773 (10th Cir. 2009) (requesting 
the injunction of application of poultry litter on fields in a watershed); Cmty. Ass’n for 
Restoration of the Env’t v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943, 953–54 (9th Cir. 2002) (chal-
lenging the overapplication and misapplication of manure to a field that led to discharges 
to navigable waters); Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Premium Standard Farms, Inc., 100 S.W.3d 
157, 158 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (contesting the grazing of cattle under a state corporate 
farming statute); Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 205 
P.3d 950, 953–54 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (challenging a general permit application that 
would allow CAFOs to spread manure and litter on fields). See generally Tyson Complaint, 
supra note 41 (lawsuit against poultry integrators). 
43 See 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b) (2010). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. § 122.23(b)(4), (6), (9). 
46 See id. § 122.23(a). Medium CAFOs need a NPDES permit if they discharge pollut-
ants directly into waters of the United States, or pollutants originating outside the facility 
are discharged into waters of the United States. Id. § 122.23(b)(6)(ii). 
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300 or more cattle consisting of veal calves, heifers, bulls, 
steers, cow-calf pairs; 
750 or more swine weighing fifty-five pounds or more; 
3000 or more swine weighing less than fifty-five pounds; or 
37,500 or more poultry with a non-liquid manure system.47 
Farms with fewer animals than listed in the CAFO Rule are treated as 
nonpoint source polluters, and dispose of their animal waste under vol-
untary best management practices.48 Under state nonpoint source pol-
lution law, the regulation of agricultural pollution on these smaller 
farms has been unsuccessful.49 Distinctions in NPDES permitting re-
quirements exist between Medium and Large CAFOs, but the federal 
public participation provisions are the same.50 
 For two decades, environmental groups have sought to enhance 
the enforcement of the NPDES permitting programs over CAFOs.51 A 
consent decree by the EPA concerning inadequate regulations to con-
trol discharges led to a court order in 1992, under which the EPA 
agreed to revise its effluent limitation guidelines.52 The EPA adopted 
revised federal regulations governing discharges from CAFOs in 2003. 
Groups challenged whether the provisions complied with the public 
participation requirements of the CWA.53 In drafting revised regula-
tions for CAFOs, the EPA is in the difficult situation of attempting to 
comply with the CWA and judicial directives, while responding to ar-
guments by contentious environmental and agricultural interest 
                                                                                                                      
47 Id. § 122.23(b)(6)(i) (prescribing minimum animal numbers for Medium CAFOs). 
48 See Margaret Rosso Grossman, Agriculture and the Polluter Pays Principle: An Introduc-
tion, 59 Okla. L. Rev. 1, 44 (2006) (noting that regulation of nonpoint source pollution 
remains weak). 
49 See id. 
50 See Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 503–04 (2d Cir. 2005); see 
also 40 C.F.R. §§ 25.1, 25.2, 122.1 (setting forth the suggested public participation elements 
for Clean Water Act programs). 
51 See Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943, 954 
(9th Cir. 2002); Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t v. Sid Koopman Dairy, 54 F. 
Supp. 2d 976, 981 (E.D. Wash. 1999); Claudia Copeland, Cong. Research Serv., RL 
31851, Animal Waste and Water Quality: EPA Regulation of Concentrated Animal 
Feeding Operations (CAFOs) 8–9 (2010). 
52 See generally NRDC v. Reilly, No. 89–2980, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5334 (D.D.C. Apr. 
23, 1991), modified sub nom. NRDC v. Whitman No. 89–2980 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 1992) (result-
ing in a consent decree that required the EPA to develop new effluent limitation guide-
lines for some CAFOs); see also 69 Fed. Reg. 22475 (Apr. 26, 2004); Michael Steeves, The 
EPA’s Proposed CAFO Regulations Fall Short of Ensuring the Integrity of Our Nation’s Waters, 22 J. 
Land Resources & Envtl. L. 367, 367–68 (2002) (noting why the EPA revised the regula-
tions). 
53 Preamble to the 2003 CAFO Rule, supra note 19, at 7233–34. 
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groups.54 The problem involves the failure of many waters to meet the 
water quality goals set by the CWA.55 While environmental and agricul-
tural interest groups argue about what is required by the CWA, past and 
current controls and practices have not removed sufficient pollutants 
to meet water quality objectives.56 
 Although accurate information regarding the number, size, and 
location of CAFOs nationwide is not available,57 it is assumed that con-
siderable amounts of phosphorus and nitrogen in impaired waters 
come from facilities producing animals.58 Specifically, due to concen-
trations of animals, and the expense of hauling manure to more distant 
fields, manure is over-applied to the fields surrounding CAFOs, creat-
ing a nonpoint source of excess nitrogen and phosphorous.59 A study 
by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimated that 
in 1997 more than one-half of the nation’s hog farms applied too much 
manure to fields based on the nitrogen needs of crops being grown.60 
Estimates suggest that three-fourths of the country’s largest dairy farms 
apply manure above amounts of nitrogen needed for crop produc-
tion.61 The study also surmised that sixty-four percent of phosphorus in 
hog manure exceeds amounts needed for crop production.62 
 Under the 2008 CAFO Rule, separate regulatory provisions apply 
to areas where animals are being produced and areas used for the land 
application of manure.63 Production areas at Large CAFOs consisting 
of animal confinement areas, manure storage areas, raw materials stor-
                                                                                                                      
54 See Copeland, supra note 51, at 15–21. 
55 See EPA, Office of Water, EPA 841-R-08-001, National Water Quality Inventory: 
2004 Report to Congress 1 (2009). A recent EPA report found that forty-four percent of 
the nation’s rivers and streams were not clean enough to support their designated uses. Id. 
56 See id. at 1–2. 
57 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-08-944, Concentrated Animal 
Feeding Operations: EPA Needs More Information and a Clearly Defined Strategy 
to Protect Air and Water Quality from Pollutants of Concern 17 (2008) [herein-
after GAO Report]. The EPA also admitted that “it lacks information on the extent to 
which water pollutants are actually being discharged by CAFOs.” Id. at 6. 
58 Ribaudo et al., supra note 39, at iii. 
59 See Krishna P. Paudel et al., Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Based Model of Dairy 
Manure Transportation and Application with Environmental Quality Consideration, 29 Waste 
Mgmt. 1634, 1640–41 (2009) (evaluating the economics of transporting dairy manure to 
suggest that it may be over-applied when it is uneconomical to haul the manure to distant 
fields). 
60 Ribaudo et al., supra note 39, at 14. 
61 Id. at 16, 25 (reporting for farms with more than 1000 animal units, which is equiva-
lent to 700 dairy cows). 
62 Id. at 25. 
63 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(3), (8) (2010). 
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age areas, and waste containment areas cannot have any discharges to 
surface waters, although exceptions exist for storm events.64 For land 
application areas under the control of a CAFO owner or operator, agri-
cultural stormwater discharges are allowed.65 This suggests that most 
pollutants from permitted CAFOs come from manure being applied to 
fields.66 It also is not known how many pollutants come from non-
regulated animal production operations, including production where 
grazing animals may defecate in surface waters.67 
 Resistance to complying with the CWA’s regulatory controls to re-
duce water pollution is based on economics.68 It is costly for agricul-
tural producers to adhere to best management practices and secure 
NPDES permits, prompting agricultural interest groups to argue for 
fewer controls and more exceptions.69 The USDA estimated in 2003 
that the development of a comprehensive nutrient management plan 
would cost a farm more than $8100.70 A recent study suggested that nu-
trient management planning for nitrogen may cost a farm a loss of 
profits ranging from twelve to nineteen percent.71 It is also expensive 
for state permitting agencies to oversee permit applications and inspec-
tions, meaning that states may also support interpretations of the CWA 
                                                                                                                      
64 Id. § 122.23(b)(8) (definition of production area). Large CAFOs are not able to have 
any discharge from production areas. Id. §§ 412.12(a), 412.13(a), 412.15(a), 412.25(a), 
412.31(a), 412.46(a). Rainfall events causing discharges from Large CAFOs are not pre-
cluded by the CAFO Rule if the CAFO is designed to not have runoff except from a twenty-
five year, twenty-four hour rainfall event. Id. §§ 412.15(b), 412.25(b), 412.31(a)(1). 
65 Id. § 122.23(e). 
66 See Ribaudo et al., supra note 39, at 1 (discussing how land application is the pre-
dominant method for disposing of manure). 
67 Terence J. Centner et al., Small Livestock Producers with Diffuse Water Pollutants: Adopt-
ing a Disincentive for Unacceptable Manure Application Practices, Desalination, June 25, 2008, 
at 66, 67. 
68 See Preamble to the 2003 CAFO Rule, supra note 19, at 7242–50 (explaining how the 
EPA considered costs in the adoption of the 2003 CAFO Rule). 
69 See Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 504–06 (2d Cir. 2005). In 
the Waterkeeper lawsuit, agricultural interest groups were successful in challenging a duty to 
apply requirement introduced in the 2003 CAFO Rule that would have mandated more 
operators to apply for NPDES permits. Id. at 504–05. 
70 USDA, Natural Res. Conservation Serv., Costs Associated with Development 
and Implementation of Comprehensive Nutrient Management Plans (CNMP) 105 
(2003) (noting that costs might vary greatly among operations). 
71 Kenneth A. Baerenklau et al., Effects of Nutrient Restrictions on Confined Animal Facili-
ties: Insights from a Structural-Dynamic Model, 56 Canadian J. Agric. Econ. 219, 234 (2008) 
(evaluating nitrogen-based nutrient management plan costs). 
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that minimize regulatory oversight.72 In addition, the lack of personnel 
in state permitting agencies may limit enforcement actions.73 
 During the development of the 2003 CAFO Rule, the EPA estimated 
that only twenty percent of CAFOs required to have permits actually had 
been issued one by a permitting authority.74 With the revised provisions 
of the 2003 CAFO Rule, more CAFOs have applied for permits.75 Com-
pliance with the rule, however, may not achieve desired water quality 
goals. Permitted CAFOs are able to have agricultural stormwater dis-
charges, and non-CAFOs may also contribute significant amounts of pol-
lutants to surface waters.76 Many larger production facilities do not have 
sufficient acreages for applying their animal waste so it is often over-
applied on fields.77 CAFOs with NPDES permits would be violating the 
terms of their permits by over-applying manure in this way; animal op-
erations without permits would simply be failing to comply with volun-
tary best management practices.78 In both cases, sanctions for over-
application have been rare.79 
 Given this lack of effective enforcement, and continued nutrient 
contamination from animal production, citizens and environmental 
groups have sought to help enforce the NPDES permit requirements.80 
However, a lack of information has limited the ability of citizens to 
                                                                                                                      
72 See Preamble to the 2003 CAFO Rule, supra note 19, at 7242. In proposing the 2003 
CAFO Rule, the EPA estimated that the administrative costs to federal and state govern-
ments would be $9,000,000 per year. Id. 
73 See Charles Duhigg, Clean Water Laws Are Neglected, at a Cost in Suffering, N.Y. Times, 
Sept. 13, 2009, at A1. 
74 NPDES Permit Regulation and Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for 
CAFOs, 66 Fed. Reg. 2960, 3080 (proposed Jan. 12, 2001) (noting that only 2500 out of an 
estimated 12,700 CAFOs with more than 1000 animal units obtained NPDES permits). 
75 The EPA estimated that as of March 2008, about 9000 of an estimated 19,000 Me-
dium and Large CAFOs had permits. EPA Targets Clean Water Act Violations at Livestock Feed-
ing Operations, EPA Enforcement Alert, March 2009, at 1–2. 
76 40 C.F.R. § 412.15(b), 412.25(b), 412.31(a)(1). See Centner et al., supra note 67, at 
66–67. 
77 Ribaudo et al., supra note 39, at 14, 31. 
78 See 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (2006); Ribaudo et al., supra note 39, at 14, 31. 
79 See GAO Report, supra note 57, at 48. The EPA admitted that it “has neither the in-
formation it needs to assess the extent to which CAFOs may be contributing to water pol-
lution, nor the information it needs to ensure compliance with the Clean Water Act.” Id. 
80 See, e.g., Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943, 
954 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming the finding of ongoing violations of the CWA by the defen-
dant); Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1181–82 (D. Idaho 2001) 
(finding evidence of a possible violation of a NPDES permit); Water Keeper Alliance, Inc. 
v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., Nos. 4:01-CV-27-H(3), 4:01-CV-30-H(3), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21314, at *7 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 20, 2001) (finding that failure to secure a NPDES permit is a 
violation of the CWA). 
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monitor and enforce water quality limitations.81 Since NPDES permits 
set forth practices to reduce pollutant discharges, unless citizens have 
access to the information required in these permits, they cannot effec-
tively help enforce limitations against polluters who are violating the 
CWA.82 The EPA and state permitting authorities have not been dili-
gent in enacting regulations that mandate public participation, so envi-
ronmental groups have had to resort to litigation to enforce public par-
ticipation opportunities mandated by the congressional dictates of the 
CWA.83 
II. Public Participation Under the CWA 
 An analysis of the CWA’s requirements for public participation 
starts with the text of section 101. The Act is intended “to restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s 
waters.”84 To achieve this goal, the CWA precludes discharges of pollut-
ants from point sources into navigable waters, unless the point source 
discharger has obtained a NPDES permit.85 Through the NPDES per-
mit program, the Act reduces the amount of pollutants into the waters 
of the United States to improve water quality.86 Simultaneously, the 
NPDES program transforms the Act’s provisions into specific obliga-
tions for pollutant discharges.87 Owners and operators of point sources 
can only discharge the specific types and amounts of pollutants author-
ized by a permit.88 
 Permits under the NPDES program are either issued by EPA di-
rectly, or by states that have been authorized by the EPA to implement 
                                                                                                                      
81 See Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 503–04 (2d Cir. 2005). 
82 See id. 
83 See id. (finding the EPA had deprived the public of an opportunity to participate guar-
anteed by the CWA); Sierra Club Mackinac Chapter v. Dep’t Envtl. Quality, 747 N.W.2d 321, 
333 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (finding that Michigan’s regulations did not satisfy the CWA’s 
citizen participation requirements). 
84 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006); see also S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 
U.S. 370, 385 (2006) (considering the need of a NPDES permit for discharges related to 
the impoundment of water for the production of hydroelectricity); S. Fla. Water Mgmt. 
Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 102 (2004) (considering the need of a 
NPDES permit for discharges from a pump station). 
85 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342. 
86 See id. § 1251(a)–(c). 
87 See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc., v. Apogee Coal Co., 555 F. Supp. 2d 640, 642 (S.D. 
W. Va. 2008) (considering a breach of obligations under a NPDES permit). 
88 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342. 
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and administer the federal NPDES provisions.89 EPA issues permits di-
rectly in only a few unauthorized states and Indian Country.90 Most 
NPDES permits are issued by state permitting authorities,91 and in some 
instances, states have authority over certain categories of discharges and 
no authority for others.92 
 With the NPDES permitting system serving as the mechanism to 
oversee point source pollution, Congress recognized the public’s need 
to have relevant information on discharge sources and control require-
ments.93 The Act’s congressional declaration of goals and policy states: 
Public participation in the development, revision, and enforce-
ment of any regulation, standard, effluent limitation, plan, or 
program established by the Administrator or any State under 
this chapter shall be provided for, encouraged, and assisted by 
the Administrator and the States. The Administrator, in coop-
eration with the States, shall develop and publish regulations 
specifying minimum guidelines for public participation in such 
processes.94 
 With this pronouncement, it is clear that agencies need to provide 
the public a genuine opportunity to be heard when taking action to 
protect waters.95 Given necessary information, the public can assist in 
the enforcement of the Act’s provisions.96 Section 402 of the Act re-
quires the EPA and state permitting authorities to provide an opportu-
nity for the public to participate prior to issuing a permit.97 However, 
the Act does not itself specify mechanisms for public participation in 
                                                                                                                      
89 State Program Status, EPA, http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm (last updated 
Apr. 14, 2003). 
90 NPDES Authorization Status for EPA’s Stormwater Construction and Industrial Programs, 
EPA, http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/stormwater/authorizationstatus.cfm (last updated Feb. 
26, 2009). 
91 See id. The EPA issues all NPDES permits in the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, 
Idaho, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and U.S. territorial possessions. Id. Every other state 
has primary permitting authority. Id. 
92 EPA issues NPDES permits for some specific discharges in Oklahoma and Texas, for 
example for discharges relating to oil and gas drilling. See id. 
93 See S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 3668–77 (1971). 
94 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (2006). 
95 See Costle v. Pac. Legal Found., 445 U.S. 198, 216 (1980) (highlighting the policy of 
encouraging public participation in the administration of the NPDES permit program). 
96 See Jennifer L. Seidenberg, Note, Texas Independent Producers & Royalty Owners 
Ass’n v. Environmental Protection Agency: Redefining the Role of Public Participation in the 
Clean Water Act, 33 Ecology L.Q. 699, 719 (2007) (arguing that “public interest groups 
have shouldered much of the burden” for enforcing the CWA’s provisions). 
97 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1), (b)(3). 
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the development and approval of NPDES permits. Rather, regulations 
developed by the EPA specify how the public is to be provided oppor-
tunities to be heard.98 
 For many permits issued under the authority of the CWA, general 
participation regulations apply. General participation regulations re-
quire agencies to: share information with the public;99 delineate re-
quirements for public hearings;100 follow protocol when holding public 
hearings;101 acknowledge advisory groups, and recommend involvement 
of groups in public participation;102 prepare summaries identifying par-
ticipation activities;103 delineate procedures for permit enforcement and 
the investigation of alleged violations;104 and require public participa-
tion in rulemaking.105 
 However, the general participation requirements do not apply to 
the NPDES permitting program.106 Instead, EPA promulgated special-
ized participation provisions for NPDES permits in part 122: 
These provisions also establish the requirements for public 
participation in EPA and State permit issuance and enforce-
ment and related variance proceedings, and in the approval 
of State NPDES programs. These provisions carry out the 
purposes of the public participation requirements of part 25 
of this chapter, and supersede the requirements of that part as 
they apply to actions covered under this part and parts 123, 
and 124 of this chapter.107 
 In addition, more specific permitting directives regarding public 
participation exist for selected categories of NPDES permits.108 The vari-
ous federal regulations show a variety of public participation require-
                                                                                                                      
98 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.1(a)(3), 122.23(h), 124.10 (2010) (noting special public participa-
tion provisions for NPDES permits, public notice for notices of intent, and public notice of 
draft permits); see also Catherine Mongeon, Note, Environmental Conservation Organiza-
tion v. City of Dallas Creates Unnecessary Burdens for Citizen Suits Under the Clean Water Act, 36 
Ecology L.Q. 237, 239–43 (2009) (examining the role and framework for citizen suits 
under the CWA). 
99 40 C.F.R. § 25.4. 
100 Id. § 25.5. 
101 Id. § 25.6. 
102 Id. § 25.7. 
103 Id. § 25.8. 
104 Id. § 25.9. 
105 40 C.F.R. § 25.10. 
106 See id. § 122.1. 
107 Id. § 122.1(a)(3). 
108 See, e.g., id. § 122.34(b)(2) (public participation recommendations for municipal 
separate storm sewer systems). 
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ments that permitting authorities must follow in issuing different types 
of permits. Given the incompleteness of statutory and regulatory public 
participation requirements, courts have been asked to decide whether 
regulatory authorities have provided adequate participation in various 
stages of the permitting process. 
III. Judicial Interpretations of Public Participation  
in NPDES Permits 
 Permitting authorities and environmental groups have not always 
agreed on the meaning of public participation requirements with re-
spect to the NPDES program. Disagreements about regulating pollution 
from CAFOs have presented courts with questions regarding the ade-
quacy of public participation requirements.109 In Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. 
v. United States EPA, the Second Circuit found provisions of the 2003 
CAFO Rule failed to provide meaningful public participation in the de-
velopment of nutrient management plans required in NPDES per-
mits.110 In Sierra Club Mackinac Chapter v. Department of Environmental Qual-
ity, the Michigan Court of Appeals found Michigan’s provisions for dis-
charging under a general permit failed to provide the public an 
opportunity to be heard as mandated by federal law.111 
 Given these decisions, permitting authorities in other states may be 
confronted with challenges about the adequacy of their permitting 
provisions regarding public participation.112 The judiciary has consid-
ered three aspects of public participation in the permitting process: (1) 
the development and revision of effluent limitations; (2) the enforce-
ment of participation requirements through citizen suits; and (3) spe-
cial problems with notices of intent under general permits. 
A. Development and Revision of Effluent Limitations 
 The CWA allows the discharge of limited pollutants under NPDES 
permits, which establish effluent limitations that reduce pollutant dis-
                                                                                                                      
109 See Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 497 (2d Cir. 2005); Sierra 
Club Mackinac Chapter v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 747 N.W.2d 321, 333 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2008). 
110 399 F.3d at 503. 
111 747 N.W.2d at 333. 
112 See Danielle J. Diamond, Illinois’ Failure to Regulate Concentrated Animal Feeding Opera-
tions in Accordance with the Federal Clean Water Act, 11 Drake J. Agric. L. 185, 189, 192–93 
(2006) (concluding that Illinois’ permitting scheme violated the CWA’s public participa-
tion requirements, and advocating for the use of citizen suits to correct violations). 
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charges through the adoption of technology.113 Distinct NPDES permit-
ting provisions exist for CAFOs, concentrated aquatic animal produc-
tion facilities, aquaculture projects, stormwater discharges, and silvicul-
ture.114 However, a set of generalized public participation provisions ap-
ply to permits for all these sources.115 Some permitting authorities opted 
to reduce administrative burdens imposed by public participation 
through shortcuts or informal action.116 In other situations, the permit-
ting authorities did not require permit applicants to submit all docu-
mentation showing how pollution would be minimized.117 Without ap-
propriate documentation, permittees could set their own standards, 
which is contrary to principles delineated in the CWA.118 Furthermore, 
without adequate dialogue, the public may not express its views, and the 
permitting process may favor dischargers over environmental quality.119 
 Environmental groups challenged the 2003 CAFO Rule in Wa-
terkeeper, arguing that the rule deprived the public of the opportunity to 
participate in the permitting process,120 because it did not require 
CAFO nutrient management plans to be included in permit applica-
                                                                                                                      
113 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(e), 1311(e), 1342(a) (2006). 
114 40 C.F.R. § 122.23–.27 (2010). 
115 Id. § 122.1(a)(3). 
116 See, e.g., Sierra Club Mackinac Chapter, 747 N.W.2d at 327–28 (arguing that the ap-
proval of a general permit without specifics of how pollutants will be minimized was ade-
quate opportunity for the public to be heard). 
117 Michigan Dep’t Envtl. Quality, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System General Permit, MIG019000, at Part IA.4 (2005) (allowing for certificates of cover-
age to be issued without review of nutrient management particulars), available at http:// 
www.deq.state.mi.us/documents/deq-water-npdes-generalpermit-MIG019000.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2011). 
118 Waterkeeper, 399 F.3d at 498 (observing that the failure to meaningfully review nutri-
ent management plans allows permittees to self-regulate); Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 
832, 854 (9th Cir. 2003) (observing that unreviewed documentation created “an impermis-
sible self-regulatory system”). 
119 See Spyke, supra note 7, at 298 (arguing that public participation earlier in the de-
velopment of laws and rules is needed “to avoid capture by industry”); Reid Mullen, Note, 
Statutory Complexity Disguises Agency Capture in Citizens Coal Council v. EPA, 34 Ecology 
L.Q. 927, 931–32 (2007) (noting concern of pro-industry regulations); Marirose J. Pratt, 
Comment, The Citizen Submission Process of the NAAEC: Filling the Gap in Judicial Review of 
Federal Agency Failures to Enforce Environmental Laws, 20 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 741, 747 (2006) 
(noting the importance of preventing agency capture). 
120 Waterkeeper, 399 F.3d at 503–04; see also John C. Becker, Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. 
EPA: Why It Is Important, 36 Envtl. L. Rptr. 10,566, 10,570 (2006) (discussing public par-
ticipation as enunciated by the Waterkeeper decision); Terence J. Centner, Clarifying NPDES 
Requirements for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 14 Penn St. Envtl. L. Rev. 361, 371 
(2006) (discussing public participation pronouncements of the Waterkeeper court); Sato, 
supra note 12, at 43 (advocating public participation as an enforcement tool to ensure 
compliance). 
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tions.121 The question before the court was whether permit applications 
without plans for managing nutrient pollutants allowed meaningful 
public input to the development of effluent limitations. To answer the 
petitioners’ question, the court looked at the statutory provisions on 
public participation.122 Section 101 of the CWA requires permitting au-
thorities to facilitate public participation in the development and revi-
sion of effluent limitations contained in permit applications.123 Effluent 
limitations are prescribed by nutrient management plans developed by 
permit applicants. By failing to require the terms of nutrient manage-
ment plans to be submitted as part of the NPDES permitting process, 
the public would not have access to information on effluent limita-
tions.124 
 Indeed, the court noted that by shielding nutrient management 
plans from public scrutiny, the CAFO Rule forestalled rather than en-
couraged public participation.125 This led the Waterkeeper court to find 
that the 2003 CAFO Rule violated the plain dictates of section 101.126 
The court found that CAFO applicants for NPDES permits must submit 
nutrient management plans to permitting authorities, and the public 
has the right to participate in the development of effluent limitations 
with respect to all NPDES permits.127 Furthermore, by failing to provide 
for permitting authority review of the nutrient management plans, the 
rule was found to be arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act.128 While the court’s decision only applies to the 
permitting process for CAFOs, its reasoning provides substantial weight 
for concluding that analogous requirements apply to other NPDES 
permits.129 
 A similar result followed in the Sierra Club case, which concerned 
the approval of discharges under a general permit for CAFOs by means 
                                                                                                                      
121 The rule instead provided that a “copy of the CAFO’s site-specific nutrient man-
agement plan must be maintained on site and made available to the Director upon re-
quest.” Preamble to the 2003 CAFO Rule, supra note 19, at 7268. 
122 Waterkeeper, 399 F.3d at 503–04. 
123 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (2006). 
124 See Waterkeeper, 399 F.3d at 503–04. 
125 Id. at 504. 
126 Id. 
127 See id. 
128 Id. at 499; see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). 
129 See, e.g., Sierra Club Mackinac Chapter v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 747 N.W.2d 321, 
334–35 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (acknowledging the Waterkeeper decision in concluding that 
the Michigan permit program did not conform with the CWA). 
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of issuing notices of intent.130 Regulations adopted by the state permit-
ting authority in Michigan required submission of nutrient manage-
ment plans to the permitting authority, but did not provide for public 
participation in the plans’ development or revision.131 The Sierra Club 
court concluded that Michigan’s general permitting regulations for 
CAFOs failed to satisfy the public participation requirements of the 
CWA.132 The court found that the public is entitled to participate in the 
development of nutrient management plans that set forth dischargers’ 
effluent limitations.133 
 The EPA adopted a new federal CAFO Rule in 2008 that responded 
to issues noted by the Waterkeeper court.134 The 2008 CAFO Rule sets 
forth provisions that require public participation before permitting au-
thorities approve permits or notices of intent. Information on how 
permit applicants will implement effluent limitations to meet discharge 
requirements must be available to the public.135 With the Waterkeeper de-
cision and the 2008 CAFO Rule, public groups should have the informa-
tion they need to be more involved in administrative actions regarding 
the authorization of discharges through NPDES permits. 
B. Enforcement Through Citizen Suits 
 The CWA and other environmental statutes include citizen suit 
provisions to supplement the governmental enforcement of provisions 
regulating pollution.136 Citizens adversely affected by pollutants entering 
federal waters are able to allege violations of effluent standards required 
by the Act.137 Citizens can also contest an order issued by a regulatory 
                                                                                                                      
130 See id. at 325–26. Under Michigan’s provisions, a notice of intent was called a cer-
tificate of coverage. Id. 
131 Id. at 334. 
132 Id. at 334–35 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (2006)). 
133 Id. 
134 Preamble to the 2008 CAFO Rule, supra note 30, at 70,418. 
135 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.23(h), 124.10 (2010) (requiring public opportunity to review nu-
trient management plans submitted with notices of intent and requiring public notice of 
draft permits). 
136 See, e.g., Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cnty., 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989) (noting that citizen 
suits supplement but do not supplant governmental action); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. 
Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 67 (1987) (limiting citizen suits to ongoing viola-
tions); see also Pratt, supra note 119, at 746–47 (discussing the legislative objectives in pro-
viding for citizen suits). 
137 See Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 11 
(1981) (noting Congress intended that citizens would be able to enforce water quality 
standards); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (2006). 
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authority if it departs from what is required by statute or regulation.138 
Furthermore, citizens may bring suit against the permitting authority for 
failure to perform an act or duty under the Act.139 
 Citizen suit provisions were crafted because governments had not 
proven to be effective at enforcing environmental controls.140 The pro-
visions were intended to motivate government enforcement and abate-
ment proceedings.141 To temper a multitude of cases in the courts, most 
statutes include sixty-day notice periods to allow the government to ad-
dress alleged violations.142 Furthermore, citizens are precluded from 
suing if the government has filed an action to require compliance and is 
diligently prosecuting.143 Thus, while allowing citizen participation, the 
citizen suit provisions simultaneously seek to preclude multiple litigation 
actions. 
 Plaintiffs in the Waterkeeper case challenged the public’s ability to 
bring citizen suits under the 2003 CAFO Rule.144 By depriving the public 
of information in nutrient management plans delineating specific efflu-
ent limitations for permittees, the 2003 CAFO Rule had compromised 
the ability of persons to bring citizen lawsuits.145 Without information 
pertaining to permittees’ effluent limitations, “citizens [could not] de-
termine whether there exist[ed] a deviation from” legal requirements.146 
“Furthermore, the absence of a public plan frustrate[d] an evaluation of 
governmental diligence in prosecuting violators.”147 
                                                                                                                      
138 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1). 
139 Id. § 1365(a)(2). 
140 See, e.g., Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and Variations in Statutory Preclusions Against Succes-
sive Environmental Enforcement Actions by EPA and Citizens: Part One: Statutory Bars in Citizen 
Suit Provisions, 28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 401, 408 (2004) (noting that with the adoption of 
environmental statutes, Congress was not confident that federal and state authorities 
would fully enforce them). 
141 This conclusion comes from the Senate’s consideration of a citizen suit provision in 
the Clean Air Act. See S. Rep. No. 91–1196, at 37 (1970), reprinted in 1 Legislative His-
tory of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, at 401, 436–47 (1974). 
142 Ellen P. Chapnick, Access to the Courts, in The Law of Environmental Justice: 
Theories and Procedures to Address Disproportionate Risks 395, 402 (Michael B. 
Gerrard & Sheila R. Foster eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
143 See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B); see also Proffitt v. Rohm & Haas, 850 F.2d 1007, 1011, 
1015 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting the role of public participation through citizen suits in revers-
ing summary judgment awarded to a holder of an NPDES permit). 
144 Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 503 (2d Cir. 2005); Centner, 
supra note 120, at 371–72. 
145 Waterkeeper, 399 F.3d at 503–04; Centner, supra note 120, at 372. 
146 Waterkeeper, 399 F.3d at 503–04. This is contrary to the public participation re-
quirements of sections 101 and 402. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(e), 1342(j); Centner, supra note 
120, at 371. 
147 Centner, supra note 120, at 371–72. 
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 The Waterkeeper court found that the 2003 CAFO Rule had “im-
permissibly compromise[d] the public’s ability to bring citizen-suits.”148 
This involved the failure of the 2003 CAFO Rule to require permittees 
to submit appropriate documentation for evaluating compliance with 
the law.149 Waterkeeper noted that Congress intended citizens to “‘spur 
and supplement governmental enforcement actions.’”150 Yet, citizen 
suits can only be successful if people have sufficient information to 
learn about violations.151 This means that opportunities for securing 
information and participating in environmental permitting and en-
forcement actions are important. The court concluded that the 2003 
CAFO Rule impermissibly compromised rights accorded by the citizen 
suit provision of the CWA.152 
C. Notices of Intent Under General Permits 
 The third issue regarding public participation under NPDES per-
mits involves the right of citizens to be heard in establishing discharges 
allowed by “notices of intent” under general permits.153 General per-
mits were devised to respond to administrative burdens imposed by 
large numbers of similar dischargers in a geographical area.154 Indus-
tries are categorized according to similarities in discharge size and the 
nature of their runoff potential, and general permits are employed to 
allow coverage of multiple facilities.155 A permitting authority adopts a 
general permit with an opportunity for public input, and subsequently 
employs notices of intent to establish effluent limitations for discharg-
ers. Discharges are authorized when the permitting authority issues a 
                                                                                                                      
148 Waterkeeper, 399 F.3d 486, 503 (citing the citizen suit provision of the CWA). 
149 See id. at 502–03. 
150 Id. at 503 (quoting S. Rep. No. 99–50 (1985)). 
151 See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 42 (2002) (noting that 
knowledge of violations often depends on having access to reports and the physical surveil-
lance of discharge sources). 
152 Waterkeeper, 399 F.3d at 503. 
153 See Jeffrey M. Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES General Permits Under the Clean Water Act, 
31 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 409, 422, 465–69 (2007) (discussing the use of general permits). 
See generally EPA, Office of Wastewater Mgmt., General Permit Program Guidance 
(1989) (delineating regulations for permitting agencies to issue permits to large numbers 
of similarly-situated dischargers under a general permit and a notice of intent), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/owm0465.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2011). 
154 See, e.g., Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 881 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting ad-
ministrative burdens); see also Seidenberg, supra note 96, at 705 (discussing why the EPA 
adopted general permits for storm water discharges). 
155 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.28, 123.25 (2010). 
2011] Public Participation Challenges & NPDES Permits   21 
notice of intent.156 General permits have been adopted for stormwater 
discharges, construction activities, CAFOs, oil and gas extraction, water 
treatment facilities, coal mining activities, and sewage treatment facili-
ties.157 
 Under federal NPDES provisions, some dischargers are required 
to reduce discharges of pollutants to the “maximum extent practica-
ble”158 and others must minimize nutrient movement to surface wa-
ters.159 To meet these discharge criteria, notices of intent include site-
specific particulars on how the discharger will meet these limitations.160 
Since general permits do not set forth the particulars of how pollutant 
discharges will be reduced to required levels, the permits do not enun-
ciate effluent limitations.161 Rather, effluent limitations are established 
in notices of intent.162 To enable the public to participate in the estab-
lishment of effluent limitations, an opportunity for public participation 
is needed before the issuance of each notice of intent.163 Any permit-
ting program that omits an opportunity for the public to evaluate the 
documentation set forth in a notice of intent would make it impossible 
to discern whether mandated discharge requirements are being met.164 
Instead, without approval of effluent limitations, there is an impermis-
sible self-regulatory permitting regime that does not comply with the 
dictates of the CWA.165 
 Courts have struggled with how to handle public participation re-
quirements with respect to discharges authorized by notices of intent. 
In Texas Independent Producers and Royalty Owners Association v. EPA, EPA 
argued that since a notice of intent is not equivalent to a permit, the 
permitting requirements of the CWA did not apply to its issuance.166 
The Seventh Circuit concluded that because notices of intent were not 
                                                                                                                      
156 Gaba, supra note 153, at 411. 
157 See id. at 429–32; EPA, supra note 153, at 5. 
158 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B)(iii) (2006) (for municipal storm sewers). 
159 40 C.F.R. § 412.4(c)(2) (2010) (for Large CAFOs). 
160 See Gaba, supra note 153, at 466. 
161 See id. at 433. Discharges cannot be approved without documentation setting forth 
effluent limitations. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342 (addressing effluent limitations and re-
quiring permits). 
162 See Gaba, supra note 153, at 466. 
163 See Sierra Club Mackinac Chapter v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 747 N.W.2d 321, 334 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2008). 
164 See, e.g., id. at 334–35. 
165 Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 498 (2d Cir. 2005) (agreeing 
with environmental petitioners that a self-regulatory permitting regime is impermissible). 
166 Texas Indep. Producers & Royalty Owners Ass’n v. EPA, 410 F.3d 964, 978 (7th Cir. 
2005). 
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permits or permit applications, general permits are the document that 
receive regulatory approval.167 Deferring to the EPA, the court declined 
to require public input before approval of notices of intent.168 However, 
the Ninth Circuit viewed general permits differently in Environmental 
Defense Center v. EPA.169 The Ninth Circuit held that notices of intent 
could be treated as functional equivalents of NPDES permits, and 
therefore availability of permit application materials and an opportu-
nity for public participation in the permitting process applied to the 
issuance of notices of intent.170 
 The Waterkeeper and Sierra Club decisions suggest that the decisions 
in Texas Independent Producers and Environmental Defense Center are dat-
ed.171 The CWA’s public participation requirements set forth in subsec-
tion 101(e) apply not only to permit applications, but to all standards, 
effluent limitations, plans, and programs.172 
 The Texas Independent Producers decision failed to uphold the pub-
lic’s right to participate in developing effluent limitations as mandated 
by the CWA, because the court only mandated public participation at 
the general permit stage.173 The public’s ability to participate in the de-
velopment of a general permit does not include participation in the es-
tablishment of effluent limitations because the general permit does not 
enumerate effluent limitations for individual dischargers.174 Rather, no-
tices of intent contain effluent limitations for individual applicants.175 
With respect to the Environmental Defense Center holding, no decision of 
functional equivalency is required before addressing public participa-
tion requirements.176 Because subsection 101(e) applies to effluent limi-
tations that are set forth in notices of intent, the public must be given an 
                                                                                                                      
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). 
170 Id. at 857–58. 
171 Compare Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 503–04 (2d Cir. 2005), and 
Sierra Club Mackinac Chapter v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 747 N.W.2d 321, 334 (Mich. 
App. 2008), with Texas Indep. Producers, 410 F.3d at 978, and Envtl. Def. Ctr., 344 F.3d at 853–
54. 
172 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (2006). 
173 See Texas Indep. Producers, 410 F.3d at 978. 
174 See id. 
175 Under subsection 101(e), the public needs to be provided an opportunity to par-
ticipate in the development of effluent limitations during the approval of a notice of in-
tent. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e); see Gaba, supra note 153, at 472–73 (maintaining that a minimal 
level of public access to notices of intent containing effluent limitations is required by the 
CWA). 
176 See Envtl. Def. Ctr., 344 F.3d at 853–54. (addressing functional equivalency). 
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opportunity to participate in their development.177 Any regulatory 
scheme that allows discharges from applicants without public input con-
cerning effluent limitations is inconsistent with the public participation 
requirements delineated by the CWA.178 Given subsection 101(e)’s pub-
lic participation requirement for effluent limitations, permitting au-
thorities need to revise authorization processes that do not include pub-
lic participation in the issuance of notices of intent.179 
 Public participation does not mean that the permitting authority 
must hold a public hearing.180 Given the focus and objectives of general 
permits, public input to notices of intent might involve notification of 
the discharger’s proposal and an opportunity to comment prior to the 
authorization of a discharge by the permitting authority.181 The CWA 
and federal and state regulations delineate criteria to determine when 
public hearings are required.182 If there is insufficient public interest in 
the particulars of a notice of intent, written documentation can provide 
a meaningful opportunity to be heard.183 
IV. Public Participation and the Diligent-Prosecution  
Bar of Citizen Suits 
 Congress included citizen suit provisions in most major environ-
mental statutes so that citizens could augment federal and state en-
forcement efforts.184 In suits against violators, citizens may seek civil 
penalties or an injunction.185 While more frequent and effective en-
forcement is generally recognized as the main justification for citizen 
suit provisions, another significant goal was citizen participation in en-
                                                                                                                      
177 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e). 
178 See Seidenberg, supra note 96, at 720 (observing that the broad suggestions in gen-
eral permits do not allow meaningful review of substantive decisions). 
179 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e). 
180 See id. Under the NPDES program, an opportunity for a public hearing must be 
given prior to the issuance of a permit. Id. § 1342(a)(1). 
181 For CAFOs, regulations provide that 40 C.F.R. § 124.11–.13 delineate requirements 
for hearings. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(h)(1) (2010). Interested persons may request a hearing or 
the regional administrator or state director may hold a hearing due to public interest or to 
clarify issues. Id. § 124.11, 124.12. 
182 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e); see, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 124.11, 124.12 (CAFO regulations). 
183 See Lockett v. EPA, 319 F.3d 678, 686–87 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding a state procedure 
allowing public participation without a hearing may be sufficient to meet federal citizen 
participation requirements). 
184 See Chapnick, supra note 142, at 402; see also Miller, supra note 140, at 416–17 (not-
ing the citizen suit provisions of major federal environmental statues). 
185 See Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and Variations in Statutory Preclusions Against Successive En-
vironmental Enforcement Actions by EPA and Citizens: Part Two: Statutory Preclusions on EPA En-
forcement, 29 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 12 n.28, 13 (2005) (discussing these remedies). 
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forcement.186 This involves the ability to be heard in administrative pro-
cesses.187 For the CWA, general citizen suit provisions are set forth in 
section 505.188 
 To preclude multiple lawsuits against alleged violators, Congress 
delineated three types of limitations in the CWA: notice of violation, de-
lay between notice and commencement of suit, and a bar for diligent 
prosecution.189 With respect to the bar for diligent prosecution, two 
separate limitations are delineated.190 Subsection 505(b) bars citizen 
suits when the Administrator or state has commenced and is diligently 
prosecuting an action to require compliance.191 The second limitation 
involves administrative penalty actions under subsection 309(g).192 After 
facilitating the imposition of administrative penalties without compli-
ance, subsection 309(g) precludes duplicative penalties for the same 
violation.193 Paragraph (6)(A)(ii) of subsection 309(g) bars citizen suits 
if a state permitting authority has commenced and is diligently prosecut-
ing a state administrative penalty action comparable to federal law.194 If 
a defendant raises the diligent-prosecution bar, the court lacks jurisdic-
                                                                                                                      
186 Miller, supra note 140, at 420 (discussing the legislative history of citizen suits). 
187 See id. 
188 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006). 
189 Under the CWA, no action can be commenced prior to sixty days after notice was 
given to the EPA, the violator, and the appropriate state. Id. § 1365(b)(1). 
190 Id. §§ 1319 (g)(6), 1365(b)(1)(B). 
191 Id. § 1365(b)(1)(B). 
192 Id. § 1319(g)(6). 
193 Id.; see Ark. Wildlife Fed’n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 381 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(maintaining that the precise public participation provisions found in the CWA are not 
required but rather that the “overall regulatory scheme” needs to afford significant citizen 
participation); N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass’n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 556 
(1st Cir. 1991) (maintaining that if corrective action is taken and diligently pursued, dupli-
cative citizen actions are not needed). 
194 Specifically, the limitation concerning a comparable state action reads: 
(6) Effect of order. 
 (A) Limitation on actions under other sections. Action taken by the Ad-
ministrator or the Secretary, as the case may be, under this subsection shall 
not affect or limit the Administrator’s or Secretary’s authority to enforce any 
provision of this chapter; except that any violation . . . (ii) with respect to 
which a State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action under a 
State law comparable to this subsection . . . shall not be the subject of a civil 
penalty action under subsection (d) of this section or section 1321(b) of this 
title or section 1365 of this title. 
33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii); see also McAbee v. City of Fort Payne, 318 F.3d 1248, 1256 
(11th Cir. 2003) (finding state law not to be comparable to the administrative penalties of 
§ 1319(g)); Citizens for a Better Env’t-Cal. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 83 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th 
Cir. 1996) (finding action under state law was not comparable); Scituate, 949 F.2d at 555 
(noting that the citizen suit claim vanishes if the state is prosecuting diligently). 
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tion if it finds that the “state has commenced and is diligently prosecut-
ing the same violations under a state law ‘comparable’ to subsection 
[309(g)].”195 
 Defendants to CWA citizen suit actions have claimed that various 
state administrative actions preclude citizen suit enforcement due to the 
diligent-prosecution bar of subsection 309(g)(6)(A)(ii).196 Differences 
over what constitutes a comparable state action mean that the compara-
bility requirement is a disputatious issue.197 Early cases in the First and 
Eighth Circuits looked to the state’s total statutory enforcement scheme 
to apply an “overall comparability” test198 that gave considerable defer-
ence to the state’s enforcement efforts.199 In North and South Rivers Wa-
tershed Association v. Town of Scituate, the First Circuit established major 
parameters for evaluating comparability for precluding citizen action 
due to diligent prosecution by a state regulatory authority.200 
 Three years later, the Eighth Circuit explained that under the ra-
tionale of the Scituate court, the public only needed “a meaningful op-
portunity to participate at significant stages of the decision-making pro-
                                                                                                                      
195 Paper, Allied-Indus., Chem. & Energy Workers Int’l Union v. Cont’l Carbon Co., 
428 F.3d 1285, 1288 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii)) (noting that 
federal courts have no jurisdiction under the CWA over cases where states are diligently 
prosecuting state claims comparable to federal violations); Friends of Milwaukee’s Rivers v. 
Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 382 F.3d. 743, 751–52 (7th Cir. 2004) (analyzing subject 
matter jurisdiction under section 1319(g) of the CWA); ICI Americas, 29 F.3d at 378–82 
(analyzing the jurisdictional bar of section 1319(g)(6)(A)). 
196 See Miller, supra note 185, at 30–33 (providing a detailed examination of the use of 
state action to preclude citizen suits). 
197 See Cont’l Carbon, 428 F.3d at 1293–94 (noting that the Tenth Circuit had never ana-
lyzed appropriate factors for determining comparability but other circuits employed dif-
ferent standards). See generally Lisa Donovan, Note, Power to the People: The Tenth Circuit and 
the Right of Citizens to Sue for Equitable Relief Under Section 309(g)(6)(A) of the Clean Water Act, 
34 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 143 (2007) (discussing the diligent-prosecution bar of section 
1319(g) to advocate for a broader role in citizen participation). 
198 See Cont’l Carbon, 428 F.3d at 1294 (noting the Eighth Circuit’s “overall comparabil-
ity’ standard” in ICI Americas); McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1255 (noting the rationale of the overall 
comparability test used by the Scituate court). 
199 See ICI Americas, 29 F.3d at 381 (maintaining that the precise public participation 
provisions found in the CWA are not required but rather that the “overall regulatory 
scheme” needs to afford significant citizen participation); N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass’n, 
Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 556 (1st Cir. 1991) (maintaining that if corrective 
action has been taken and was diligently pursued, then duplicative citizen actions are not 
needed). 
200 Scituate, 949 F.2d at 555–58; see also Miller, supra note 185, at 39 (examining the 
shortcomings of Scituate); Kirstin Etela, Sixteenth Annual Pace National Environmental 
Law: Moot Court Competition, Judges’ Bench Memorandum, 21 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 355, 
406–09 (2004) (identifying flaws with the Scituate decision because the court ignored the 
plain language of the statute and the legislative history of subsection 1319(g)). 
26 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 38:1 
cess” under state law to satisfy comparability.201 In Arkansas Wildlife Fed-
eration v. ICI Americas, Inc., the Eighth Circuit decided that states were 
afforded latitude in selecting enforcement mechanisms under subsec-
tion 309(g).202 Without acknowledging subsection 101(e) of the CWA, 
which encourages public participation in the enforcement of regula-
tions,203 the court opined that comparable public participation involved 
“significant citizen participation.”204 Although the state scheme omitted 
the same public notice and comment provisions as those found in sub-
section 309(g), the court found that the scheme was comparable to the 
Federal Act.205 The Scituate and ICI Americas cases established precedents 
that circumscribed citizens’ ability to maintain enforcement actions 
against alleged violators of the CWA.206 
 In Jones v. City of Lakeland, the Sixth Circuit evaluated the enforce-
ment provisions of the Tennessee Water Quality Control Act to deter-
mine whether citizens had a “meaningful opportunity to participate” in 
enforcement actions comparable to what is provided under federal 
law.207 The court did not enunciate any comparability test but rather 
looked at whether the overall state regulatory scheme afforded citizens a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard.208 Under Tennessee’s statutory 
scheme, citizens could invoke administrative relief under Tennessee law 
in situations where the Tennessee Water Quality Control Board had en-
tered and filed a consent agreement.209 Given the limited access for pub-
lic participation, Tennessee’s provisions were not comparable to federal 
law and the diligent-prosecution bar of subsection 309(g)(6)(A)(ii) did 
not preclude a citizen suit against the city.210 
 Subsequent judicial opinions have found that the overall compa-
rability test establishes a nebulous standard that provides little guidance 
                                                                                                                      
201 ICI Americas, 29 F.3d at 381 (citing Scituate, 949 F.2d at 556 n.7). Some form of the 
overall comparability test has been adopted by the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits. 
Sierra Club v. Powellton Coal Co., 662 F. Supp. 2d 514, 527 (S.D. W. Va. 2009), modified by, 
No. 2:08–1363, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9217, at *43 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 3, 2010). 
202 See ICI Americas, 29 F.3d at 380–81 (finding that regulatory authorities are entitled 
to appropriate deference in their enforcement efforts). 
203 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (2006). 
204 See ICI Americas, 29 F.3d at 381. 
205 See id. at 381–82. 
206 See ICI Americas, 29 F.3d at 381–83; N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass’n v. Town of Scitu-
ate, 949 F.2d 552, 557–58 (1st Cir. 1991). 
207 224 F.3d 518, 523 (6th Cir. 2000). 
208 See id. The dissent cited Scituate to conclude that the state federal provisions were 
comparable. Id. at 526 (Norris, J., dissenting). 
209 See id. at 523–24. 
210 Id. at 524 (finding that the plaintiffs’ complaint set forth a cognizable claim for 
which relief could be granted). 
2011] Public Participation Challenges & NPDES Permits   27 
for determining whether a citizen action is comparable to a state’s ac-
tion.211 In analyzing the language of subsection 309(g), including com-
ponents set forth in other paragraphs of the subsection, courts rejected 
the overall comparability test in favor of a “rough comparability” ap-
proach.212 Subsection 309(g) says that the limitation against citizen suits 
applied to actions “to which a State has commenced and is diligently 
prosecuting an action under a State law comparable to this subsec-
tion.”213 Whereas a few courts looked at comparable penalty provisions, 
the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits examined subsection 309(g) as 
a whole to discern three sets of procedures that need to be comparable: 
penalty assessment, public participation, and judicial review proce-
dures.214 
                                                                                                                      
211 See, e.g., McAbee v. City of Fort Payne, 318 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2003); Sierra 
Club v. Powellton Coal Co., 662 F. Supp. 2d 514, 527 (S.D. W. Va. 2009). 
212 See, e.g., Paper, Allied-Indus., Chem. & Energy Workers Int’l Union v. Cont’l Carbon 
Co., 428 F.3d 1285, 1300 (10th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the interpretation of subsection 
309(g) reached by the Scituate court); McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1255–56 (noting the legislative 
history supports rough comparability); Citizens for a Better Env’t-Cal. v. Union Oil Co., 83 
F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 1996) (disagreeing with Scituate based on the language of the 
CWA, and stating that state actions should not “be given broader preclusive effect than the 
administrative actions of the EPA”); Wash. Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. Pendleton Wool-
en Mills, 11 F.3d 883, 885 (9th Cir. 1993) (observing that there was no legislative history 
demonstrating a congressional desire to bar more than duplicative administrative penal-
ties); Pennenvironment v. RRI Energy Ne. Mgmt. Co., No. 07–475, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
118955, at *12–13 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2009) (noting that the legislative history supported a 
conclusion that the diligent-prosecution bar only applies to duplicative penalties); Powell-
ton Coal Co., 662 F. Supp. 2d at 527 (citing legislative history to support rough comparabil-
ity between each class of provisions); Old Timer, Inc. v. Blackhawk-Cent. City Sanitation 
Dist., 51 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (D. Colo. 1999) (noting that the legislative history supports the 
conclusion that subsection 309(g) was not “to preclude citizen suits . . . when an adminis-
trative penalty proceeding has not yet been commenced”); L.E.A.D. Grp. of Berks v. Exide 
Corp., No. 96–3030, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2672, at *97 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 1999) (observing 
the legislative history and its intent to preclude “dual enforcement actions or penalties for 
the same violation”); Molokai Chamber of Commerce v. Kukui (Molokai), Inc., 891 F. 
Supp. 1389, 1403 (D. Haw. 1995) (noting Congress only intended the bar on citizen suits 
to apply to administrative penalty actions under subsection 309(g)); Save Our Bays & 
Beaches v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 904 F. Supp. 1098, 1132 (D. Haw. 1994) (stating that 
subsection 309(g) bars citizen suits only if state law “‘provide[s] for a right to hearing and 
for public notice and participation procedures similar to those set forth in section 309(g)’” 
(quoting 1133 Cong. Rec. S737 (daily ed., Jan. 14, 1987) (statement of Sen, Chafee))). 
213 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) (2006). 
214 See Cont’l Carbon, 428 F.3d at 1294 (focusing on the three categories of provisions in 
subsection 309(g)); McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1254–56 (declining to adopt the standard enunci-
ated by the Scituate court and focusing on three classes of provisions); Citizens for a Better 
Env’t, 83 F.3d at 1115–18 (looking at the comparability of penalty provisions and their 
assessment). 
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 The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in McAbee v. City of Fort Payne illus-
trates the approach of these circuit courts.215 In rejecting the overall 
comparability test employed by the Scituate and ICI Americas courts, the 
Eleventh Circuit observed that the test involved weighing incommen-
surable values and created uncertainty.216 Instead, the McAbee court em-
ployed a rough comparability standard for determining whether the 
citizen suit was precluded by state action.217 The court examined the 
state’s public participation provisions with those in subsection 309(g)(4) 
and found they were not comparable.218 Because the state did not offer 
comparable opportunities for the public to participate in administrative 
enforcement penalties, the diligent-prosecution bar provided by subsec-
tion 309(g) did not preclude the citizen suit.219 
 A rough comparability interpretation of subsection 309(g) makes 
it easier for plaintiffs to qualify for jurisdiction in a citizen suit.220 Citi-
zen suits are only precluded if the defendant establishes rough compa-
rability between each set of state procedures and federal law.221 Courts 
that ignore one or more of these components in finding a state action 
to be comparable to subsection 309(g) disregard the statutory scheme 
established by Congress.222 The plain meaning of subsection 309(g) is 
that comparable state actions must involve similar penalties, participa-
tion opportunities, and opportunities for judicial review.223 
 While federal circuit courts have reached conflicting interpreta-
tions on when subsection 309(g)(6) bars jurisdiction of a citizen suit, 
courts tend to agree that a state action is not comparable if there was 
no opportunity for the public to participate in a significant stage.224 A 
                                                                                                                      
215 See 318 F.3d at 1254–56. 
216 Id. at 1255. 
217 See id. at 1255–56. The court felt that § 309(g)(6)(A) required each class of state-
law provisions to be roughly comparable due to comments by its principal author and 
sponsor. Id. 
218 Id. at 1256–57. 
219 Id. at 1257. 
220 See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Env’t-Cal. v. Union Oil Co., 83 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th 
Cir. 1996). 
221 See Paper, Allied-Indus., Chem. & Energy Workers Int’l Union v. Cont’l Carbon Co., 
428 F.3d 1285, 1293–94 (10th Cir. 2005) (supporting the rough comparability standard). 
222 See McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1255–56 (noting that “legislative history supports requiring 
rough comparability between each class of provisions.”). 
223 See generally Miller, supra note 185, at 21–30 (evaluating the plain meaning of sub-
section 309(g)). 
224 See McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1257 (finding state public participation provisions to not be 
comparable to the participation afforded by the CWA); Jones v. City of Lakeland, 224 F.3d 
518, 524 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding a state action was not comparable because the public 
lacked “a meaningful opportunity to participate at significant stages of the administrative 
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majority of courts have concluded that to be comparable to subsection 
309(g), the state needs to afford citizens reasonable opportunities to 
participate in the administrative enforcement procedure.225 Courts 
have recognized that Congress intended that citizens be active in over-
seeing the water quality standards of the CWA.226 
V. Authorizing Discharges Without Public Participation 
 Although the diligent-prosecution bar does not address public par-
ticipation in the NPDES permit approval process,227 the judicial inter-
pretations of the statutory provisions are instructive.228 Subsection 
309(g)(4) of the CWA delineates rights for the public before the as-
sessment of an administrative penalty.229 Subsection 101(e) commands 
that public participation shall be provided and encouraged in the de-
velopment, revision, and enforcement of effluent limitations set forth in 
NPDES permits.230 Both statutory provisions concern transparency: pro-
viding citizens notice of what the administering agency is doing, fol-
lowed by an opportunity to participate prior to the agency’s final ac-
tion.231 For the diligent-prosecution bar, state enforcement agencies 
must provide a meaningful opportunity for the public to participate in 
significant stages of administrative penalty actions.232 Under subsection 
101(e), the public must have meaningful opportunity to comment on 
                                                                                                                      
decision-making process”); Ark. Wildlife Fed’n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 381 (8th 
Cir. 1994) (citing N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass’n v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 556 & 
n.7 (1st Cir. 1991)); L.E.A.D. Grp. of Berks v. Exide Corp., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2692, at 
*101 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 1999) (declining to find a state action comparable to federal law 
because it lacked meaningful opportunity for the public to participate in the assessment of 
penalties). 
225 L.E.A.D. Grp., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2692, at *99 (citing ICI Americas, 29 F.3d at 
381); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Vygen Corp., 803 F. Supp. 97, 101 (N.D. Ohio 
1992); Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 770 F. Supp. 943, 951 (D.N.J. 
1991); Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co., 735 F. Supp. 1404, 
1415 (N.D. Ind. 1990). 
226 See McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1255–56 (noting that legislative history supports a finding 
that state laws must provide significant public participation opportunities in order to be 
comparable to Section 309(g)). 
227 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6) (2006). 
228 See generally McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1256; Jones, 224 F.3d at 524. 
229 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(4). 
230 See id. § 1251(e). 
231 See id. §§ 1251(e), 1319(g)(4)(A). 
232 See McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1253; Jones, 224 F.3d at 524; ICI Americas, 29 F.3d at 381; 
Lockett v. EPA, 176 F. Supp. 2d 628, 633 (E.D. La. 2001), aff’d 319 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2003); 
Citizens Legal Envtl. Action Network, Inc. v. Premium Standard Farms, Inc., No. 97-6073-
CV-SJ-6, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1990, at *60 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 2000); Knee Deep Cattle 
Co. v. Bindana Invs. Co., 904 F. Supp. 1177, 1182 (D. Or. 1995). 
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proposed effluent limitations before an authorized state regulatory 
agency issues a permit or notice of intent allowing for the discharge of 
pollutants.233 
 The judicial responses to citizen suits addressing the diligent-
prosecution bar show that the omission of an opportunity for public 
participation means the state action is not comparable.234 When a state 
action is not comparable, citizens may maintain their citizen suits.235 
The lesson from these cases is that Congress intended the public to 
have an opportunity to participate in the imposition of administrative 
penalties under subsection 309(g).236 Public participation is important; 
any regulatory or administrative action that forgoes providing an op-
portunity for citizen input may be challenged, and failure to provide an 
opportunity for public participation means citizen suits are possible.237 
 With respect to the NPDES permitting program, Congress was 
even more emphatic in providing opportunities for the public to par-
ticipate: public participation in establishing effluent limitations is to be 
encouraged.238 Moreover, subsection 1342(a) of the CWA also requires 
an opportunity for a hearing prior to issuance of an NPDES permit.239 
Any regulation or action by the EPA or state permitting authority that 
does not provide adequate opportunities for public participation in the 
development, revision, or enforcement of a permit offends the statu-
tory requirement.240 How should courts respond to complaints that the 
public was excluded from being able to participate in the development 
or revision of effluent limitations? Cases addressing the issue of lack of 
participation in proceedings involving NPDES permits may be differen-
tiated into two groups: inadequate participation before issuing permits, 
and inadequate participation during purported modifications. 
                                                                                                                      
233 See 33 U.S.C. 1251(e); see also Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. Apogee Coal Co., 555 
F. Supp. 2d 640, 647 (S.D. W. Va. 2008) (concluding that failure to comply with public 
notification procedures meant that the agency could not modify a permit through a com-
pliance order). 
234 See, e.g., McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1256; Jones, 224 F.3d at 524. 
235 See, e.g., McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1257. 
236 See Save Our Bays & Beaches v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 904 F. Supp. 1098, 1132 
(D. Haw. 1994); see also 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(e), 1319(g)(4)(A). 
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238 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (2006). 
239 Id. § 1342(a)(1), (b)(3). 
240 See id. 
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A. Inadequate Participation Before Issuing Permits 
 In cases involving inadequate public participation in the issuance of 
new permits, the most direct and effective citizen suit action is to chal-
lenge the government’s action.241 Citizens can allege the regulations fail 
to comport to federal participation requirements, as occurred in Wa-
terkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. United States EPA, or they may allege that the 
regulatory authority failed to adhere to public participation require-
ments set forth in statutory or regulatory provisions.242 These suits 
would vacate the offending provisions or request an order to secure 
compliance with public participation requirements. 
 In discussing problems with the regulation of discharges from CA-
FOs, citizen suits forced the EPA to revise the federal CAFO Rule.243 Due 
to a citizen lawsuit commenced by the Natural Resources Defense 
Council in 1989, the EPA agreed to amend the CAFO Rule.244 In the 
2003 CAFO Rule, the EPA omitted a requirement under which the pub-
lic would have access to information on effluent limitations in CAFO 
NPDES permit applications.245 The citizen suit challenge in Waterkeeper 
led the Second Circuit to find that the 2003 CAFO Rule violated the 
CWA by forestalling public participation.246 As a result of the Waterkeeper 
lawsuit, the EPA amended its regulations in 2008 to require opportuni-
ties for public input prior to the approval of discharges through notices 
of intent and permits.247 
 For individual NPDES permits, regulations require public notice 
of draft permits248 and the 2008 CAFO Rule requires applicants to sub-
mit a nutrient management plan.249 With the submission of nutrient 
management plans, the public will have an opportunity to evaluate the 
                                                                                                                      
241 See, e.g., Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 524 (2d Cir. 2005). 
242 See id. at 524 (vacating the 2003 CAFO Rule’s provisions concerning inadequate 
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247 See Preamble to the 2008 CAFO Rule, supra note 30, at 70,468, 70,480–81. 
248 40 C.F.R. § 124.10(a) (2010). 
249 Id. § 122.21(i)(x) (permit applications must contain nutrient management plans). 
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effluent standards set forth in the applications.250 With respect to no-
tices of intent under general permits, each notice must include a nutri-
ent management plan that is made available for public review.251 Per-
mitting authorities are required to respond to significant comments 
and may require revisions to submitted nutrient management plans.252 
These provisions definitively establish opportunities for public partici-
pation prior to approval of documentation allowing discharges.253 
 However, some state permitting authorities may not have adopted 
similar provisions.254 State CAFO regulations that fail to allow citizen in-
put to the development of effluent limitations should be found to be 
arbitrary and capricious.255 Similarly, state permitting requirements for 
discharges from other sources can be challenged if they fail to provide 
reasonable opportunity for public input as required by subsection 
101(e) of the CWA.256 Waterkeeper establishes that whenever a permitting 
authority’s regulations fail to provide an opportunity for public partici-
pation in the development or revision of a permit, citizens are able to 
bring a citizen suit to secure an opportunity for public input.257 
B. Inadequate Participation in Modifying a Permit 
 Several courts have considered citizen suits addressing discharges 
where permitting authorities failed to provide the public an opportunity 
to be heard prior to the modification of permits authorizing dis-
charges.258 The courts’ decisions suggest that agency action without pro-
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258 See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 191 F.3d 516, 524, 526 (4th Cir. 1999) 
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F.2d 1007, 1012 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting that substantial changes to a permit require public 
notice under federal regulation then in effect); Envtl. Coal. v. Apogee Coal Co., 555 F. 
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2011] Public Participation Challenges & NPDES Permits   33 
viding the public an opportunity to be heard is a serious problem. Re-
sponses to this problem include vacating deficient orders or finding the 
administrative actions to be invalid or void.259 The attempted modifica-
tions would be ineffective in providing legal authority for discharges so 
that the discharge limitations of the existing, unrevised permit would 
apply.260 Thus, although the permit would not contain the terms re-
quested by the permittee to authorize discharges, the underlying origi-
nal permit would address discharges.261 
 The Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuit s have considered efforts to 
modify permits without public participation and offered insights on 
what to do when the public is denied an opportunity to participate in 
the establishment of effluent limitations. In Proffit v. Rohm & Haas, the 
Third Circuit considered a purported modified permit.262 The evidence 
showed that substantial changes were incorporated in an amended 
permit without an opportunity for public participation.263 After noting 
that amended permits with substantial changes required public notice 
of the proposed modification to inform interested and potentially inter-
ested persons of discharges, the court found that the citizen suit allega-
tions involved violations of effluent limitations established in both the 
original and amended permits.264 Therefore, the circuit court did “not 
decide the nice question of which permit, if any, is applicable.”265 Ra-
ther, the plaintiff had alleged a continuing violation so the trial court 
had erred in dismissing the suit.266 
 In Citizens for a Better Environment-California v. Union Oil Co. of Cali-
fornia, the district court declined to dismiss a citizen suit’s effluent 
                                                                                                                      
259 See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Env’t, 83 F.3d at 1119–20; Proffitt, 850 F.2d at 1012, 1014; 
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standards claim.267 The defendant had maintained that a cease and de-
sist order modified its permit compliance date to provide a defense 
against the action.268 In affirming the district court, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that there was no modified permit.269 Because the permit 
had not been modified, the court never decided what happens when a 
permitting agency fails to conform with public participation require-
ments.270 
 The Fourth Circuit had an opportunity to consider the modifica-
tion of a permit in United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc.271 The defendant 
argued that its permit had not been violated because orders from the 
state permitting authority “superseded and revised” the permit.272 In 
rejecting this argument, the district court had found that because the 
defendant “‘did not follow the procedures required for the modifica-
tion of a permit, and none of the [permitting authority’s] Special Or-
ders and letters were issued in accordance with the permit modification 
procedures,’” the permit was not modified.273 Affirming the district 
court’s reasoning, the Fourth Circuit agreed that the permit had not 
been revised so the district court was correct in granting the plaintiff 
summary judgment on the issue of liability.274 
 Federal district courts have cited these three circuit court cases 
and have extended the reasoning to find that the absence of an oppor-
tunity for public participation may mean that an administrative action 
does not revise a permit. Five district court cases may be examined to 
discern their responses to actions intended to modify permits. 
 In Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition, Inc. v. Apogee Coal Co., the de-
fendant of a citizen suit claimed that a compliance order suspended the 
limits of a permit issued under a state-run NPDES program.275 Given the 
terms of the compliance order, if it modified the permit, the permittee 
was in compliance with pollutant limitations and the plaintiff would 
have no cause of action.276 In analyzing the allegations of permit viola-
                                                                                                                      
267 83 F.3d, 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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tions, the court concluded that three circuit courts “have held that a 
modification to a permit will not prevent a citizen suit action on the 
terms of the underlying permit if that modification does not comport 
with proper procedure,” citing Proffit, Citizens for a Better Environment, 
and Smithfield Foods.277 Based upon these precedents, the district court 
held that any procedurally flawed modification “cannot change the 
terms of the underlying permit.”278 
 A district court in New York made a number of pronouncements 
about modifying permits in Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Mirant Lovett, LLC.279 An 
environmental plaintiff argued that a defendant’s power station was 
violating the provisions of its state permit.280 The defendant countered 
this allegation by claiming that a consent order signed by the state 
permitting authority had modified the terms of the permit so there was 
no violation.281 In concluding that the consent order did not modify 
the permit, the Riverkeeper court viewed the consent order as establish-
ing a compliance schedule that provided for deferring the enforce-
ment of requirements set forth in the permit.282 As a settlement for the 
selective non-enforcement of permit terms, the consent order did not 
bar citizen suits under the CWA.283 The Riverkeeper court also com-
mented that because federal law requires public participation in the 
revision of a permit, it was unlikely that a consent order involving a 
permitting authority and a defendant would offer such an opportu-
nity.284 In the absence of an opportunity for public input, the court felt 
that any modification by a consent order would be invalid.285 
 Two cases from Pennsylvania considered citizen suits with issues 
about whether permits had been modified. In Profitt v. Lower Bucks Coun-
ty Joint Municipal Authority, a permitting authority issued a consent order 
establishing interim, lower effluent limitations than were present in the 
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permit.286 After citing the federal regulatory authority for modifying 
NPDES permits, the court noted that the proper steps for the modifica-
tion of a permit were not followed.287 The Bucks County court decided 
that the consent order could not modify the permit.288 The logic of the 
Bucks County court’s analysis was adopted in Pennsylvania Public Interest 
Research Group v. P.H. Glatfelter Co.289 The P.H. Glatfelter court noted that if 
a permitting authority does not follow proper modification procedures 
before entering a consent agreement, the agreement does not alter the 
defendant’s permit obligations.290 Improper modification procedures 
mean that the resulting orders or permits are invalid.291 
 Other support for finding modifications to permits invalid is of-
fered by a district court decision in Sierra Club v. Cripple Creek & Victor 
Gold Mining Co.292 The court noted that a purported permit modifica-
tion by agency letter, agency order, or stipulation without public oppor-
tunity to be heard was void as a matter of law.293 Whether the court 
finds an administrative action void, invalid, or failing to alter permit 
obligations, the effect is that the action does not modify the underlying 
permit.294 Support for not allowing permits to be modified without 
public input is the policy delineated in the CWA of encouraging public 
participation in the administration of the NPDES permit program.295 
Agencies that disregard this policy expose permittees to citizen suits. 
 Drawing on the reasoning adopted by courts regarding permit 
modifications, it might be argued that any permit issued by a regulatory 
authority without an opportunity for public input should be ineffective 
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Legal Found., 445 U.S. 198, 215–16 (1980)). 
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in authorizing discharges. Because the CWA places participation by the 
public as an integral component of the NPDES permitting scheme, 
failure to give notice to the public and allow participation might be in-
terpreted to mean that the permitting authority cannot issue a valid 
permit.296 However, courts have not reached this result. Instead, lapses 
by permitting authorities not following public participation require-
ments are addressed by citizen suits against the agency. 
Conclusion 
 Although Congress and state legislatures have enacted numerous 
laws to enhance environmental quality, many Americans continue to be 
adversely affected by air and water pollution. One problem is the lack of 
governmental response to violations of environmental laws. Govern-
ments are not able to diligently enforce environmental laws.297 Due to a 
number of reasons, including inadequate budgets, Congress anticipated 
this problem, and countered it by including citizen suit provisions in 
major environmental laws that allow citizens to take up the slack and 
bring suits to address violations. The inclusion of a citizen suit provision 
in an environmental statute demonstrates congressional intent to have 
the public help oversee environmental quality and regulatory compli-
ance. In addition to citizen suit provisions, many statutes require oppor-
tunities for the public to be involved with administrative permitting and 
penalty actions.298 
 When citizen participation is included in a statute, questions arise 
regarding what kinds of participation are required, what administrative 
actions must include opportunities for citizen input, when citizens can 
make input, and what kind of input may be made.299 In analyzing the 
congressional directives set forth in subsection 101(e) of the CWA, it is 
clear that Congress intended citizens to be able to participate in the 
“development, revision, and enforcement of any regulation, standard, 
effluent limitation, plan, or program” established under the Act.300 This 
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means that under the CWA, citizens should be able to participate in the 
development of effluent limitations set forth in NPDES permits. Fur-
thermore, if a permittee desires to modify a permit, the citizen partici-
pation provisions remain applicable.301 Any cease and desist order, con-
sent order, compliance order, or other document that is intended to 
modify a permit should only be effective if the public receives notifica-
tion and is provided an opportunity to participate.302 While these re-
quirements for public participation may be cumbersome, participation 
fosters public involvement in facilitating the environmental objectives 
delineated by Congress in various statutes. 
 An analysis of judicial rulings on public participation offers two 
suggestions for regulators and permittees involved in the NPDES per-
mitting process. First, permittees have an interest in helping their per-
mitting authority follow legal directives on public participation. If a 
permitting authority issues permits without adequate opportunity for 
public input, the agency’s actions may be challenged and the validity of 
existing permits may become an issue.303 Permittees should want per-
mitting authorities to follow the public participation requirements 
mandated by statutory and regulatory provisions to reduce the risk of 
being liable for unauthorized discharges.304 
 Second, Congress and the courts have noted that an opportunity 
for public participation is an important aspect of the issuance of per-
mits. These pronouncements suggest that citizen groups may become 
even more active in enforcing environmental standards.305 If a water-
body is polluted, an environmental group might evaluate the facts and 
proceedings to determine whether a citizen suit is possible. Groups can 
seek out the sources of pollutants, examine the effluent limitations au-
thorized by the sources’ NPDES permits, and learn whether the public 
had access to documentation prior to the issuance of the permits. If the 
public did not have input in developing the effluent limitations set forth 
in a permit or revised permit, a citizen suit may be possible. If a permit-
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tee’s pollutant loadings or other significant parameters in the permit 
are not being followed, this may also form the basis of a citizen suit. 
 The statutory directives on citizen participation are demanding; 
any deviation from the requirements by a permittee or any noncompli-
ance with statutory or regulatory directives by a permitting authority 
offers an argument that can be raised in a citizen suit. Efforts to attain 
environmental quality objectives show a progression of requirements, 
actions, and remedies. While Congress established basic controls in ma-
jor environmental statutes decades ago, regulatory agencies and the 
public are still developing the framework and procedures to respond to 
pollution problems.306 Citizen participation has been instrumental in 
forging environmental controls that can effectively reduce pollution 
and contamination problems. Recent developments suggest that citi-
zens can be even more active in championing environmental quality. 
Greater citizen participation in the permitting process can enhance the 
efforts of permitting authorities in reducing pollutant discharges. 
 Moreover, disasters such as the explosion of an oil rig in the Gulf 
of Mexico suggest that greater citizen involvement may be needed to 
spur businesses and governmental authorities to do more in reducing 
environmental risks associated with regulated activities.307 Canada’s 
Prime Minister claimed that the environmental and safety standards of 
the United States are weaker than those of Canada, citing a rule for 
drilling relief wells during the same drilling season as the initial well.308 
Have governments been too lax in not updating safety requirements 
for offshore oil drilling?309 The oil spill is a reminder that governmental 
regulations are needed to reduce the risks of environmental disas-
ters.310 Greater citizen involvement can help governments take actions 
that would reduce risks. Simultaneously, more vigilant oversight of drill-
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ing permits may be needed to ascertain that existing offshore regula-
tions are being followed.311 
                                                                                                                      
311 40 C.F.R. pt. 112 (2010) (oil spill prevention). 
